

## TO THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND.

*On the approaching War against France.*

The last war against France swelled the annual taxes on account of the National Debt from 9 millions of pounds to 41 millions of pounds; it caused, besides this, 600 millions of pounds to be raised, during the war, in other taxes; it has reduced us to such a state, that, even in peace, loans were become necessary, besides taxes almost as heavy as in time of war. Such, in short, in a pecuniary view, were the effects of that war, that the government found it expedient to resort to a Corn-Bill, in order to raise and keep up the price of the first necessary of life, that the Owners and Tillers of the soil might be able to pay the taxes which that government wanted to pay the interest of the Debt and to maintain the military establishments.

These facts being undeniable, have we not reason to dread the consequences of another war against France? Ought we to run head-long into such a war? I have, in my four last Numbers, strenuously laboured to prevent this calamity; but, I now really begin to fear, that the wishes of the enemies of peace and freedom may finally prevail. The *Income or Property Tax* is again to be brought forward, and, if the news-papers be correct, on the same principle as before. The *Alien Act* is again to be proposed, if we are to rely upon the same sources of information. In short, if the accounts of proceedings in Parliament be true, we shall very soon be thrown back to the state of 1813 as to expence, and to 1793 as to principle of action.

In my late Numbers I have, I think, very clearly shown, that, if we now make war upon France, it will be out of the power of any human being to dispute the fact; that the war, on our part, is a war of aggression, and of aggression, too, of the most odious and intolerable kind, seeing that even its openly professed object must be to force a government, or a chief, upon France. It is said: "No: we only

"want to force the French to put down their present chief." That is to say, we, modest people! do not wish, God forbid! to interfere in the internal affairs of France; we do not wish to force a chief upon her; but, she having a chief whom we do not like, we will make war upon her, until she put him away. That is all! Our modesty will not let us go an inch further.

In order that you may clearly see what is the light, in which the French government view the matter, I shall subjoin to this address the Official Documents published in France, relative to it. In these you will find the answer, which France gives to all her enemies. Here you will find a clear description of the grounds, on which she rests. The first document contains an answer to the charges against her and her chief; the second contains the reasons for her preparing for her defence. To these documents I have prefixed the memorable Declaration of the Allies, dated at Vienna on the 13th of March. This was the first stone hurled at the French nation. A careful perusal, and an occasional reference, to these Documents, will keep fresh in the memory of every man the REAL CAUSES of the war, if war should now take place.

The *Borough-faction*, who are now crying out for war through the columns of our vile news-papers, tell us, that we cannot live in safety, while Napoleon is at the head of the government of France. This has, under all changes, been their cry for the last 22 years. We could not live at peace with the *National Assembly*. We could have no peace and safety with the *Convention*. We could not have peace and safety with the *Consuls*. We could have no peace and safety with the *Emperor* before; no, nor can we have it with him now. The *BOURBONS*: these are the people, with whom alone our *Borough-faction* think they can enjoy peace. We must, therefore, depose Napoleon: yes, as we deposed Mr. MADISON! The peace of Europe and the world; and, especially our own safety, require, we are



told, this *deposition*. But, just so we were told in the case of Mr. *Madison*. "No peace! No peace! No peace with JAMES MADISON!" was the cry of this faction. Down with him! Send Duke Wellington! Kill! kill! kill! Keep killing; keep bombarding; keep burning; keep on till James Madison be deposed; 'till that "*rebel and traitor*;" 'till that "*mischievous example of the success of democratic rebellion* be destroyed." They said our work was but *half done*, 'till this was accomplished; and, they have become almost mad since their scheme was defeated.

Well, then, Englishmen, can you believe, that these same men; that this same wicked faction, wish to put down Napoleon for the love of *freedom*? Was it for the love of freedom that they wished to depose Mr. Madison? Can you believe, that it is from the fear of our *safety* being put in danger by Napoleon? Was it from the fear of our *safety* being endangered by Mr. Madison that they wished to depose him? Do you think, that they were afraid, that Mr. Madison would *over-run Europe with his armies*? Alas! do you not see what is their *real fear*? Do you not see, that it is *liberty*; that it is *free government*; that it is the *rights of mankind*, which they wish to see *deposed*? Some patriot said: "*where liberty is, there is my country*." If this faction were to speak out honestly, they would say: "*where liberty is, there is our Hell*."

#### DECLARATION OF THE ALLIES.

The Powers who have signed the Treaty of Paris, assembled at the Congress at Vienna, being informed of the escape of NAPOLEON BONAPARTE, and of his entrance into France with an armed force, owe it to their own dignity and the interest of social order, to make a solemn declaration of the sentiments which this event has excited in them. By thus breaking the convention which has established him in the island of Elba, Bonaparte destroys the only legal title on which his existence depended—by appearing again in France with projects of confusion and disorder, he has deprived himself of the protection of the law, and has manifested to the universe, that there can be neither peace nor truce with him. The Powers consequently declare, that Napoleon Bonaparte has placed himself without the pale of civil

and social relations; and that as an enemy and disturber of the tranquillity of the world he has rendered himself liable to public vengeance. They declare at the same time, that firmly resolved to maintain entire the Treaty of Paris of the 30th May, 1814, and the dispositions sanctioned by that Treaty, and those which they have resolved on, or shall hereafter resolve on, to complete and to consolidate it, they will employ all their means, and will unite all their efforts; that the general peace, the object of the wishes of Europe, and the constant purpose of their labours, may not again be troubled; and to guarantee against every attempt which shall threaten to replunge the world into the disorders and miseries of revolutions. And although entirely persuaded that all France, rallying round its legitimate Sovereign, will immediately annihilate this last attempt of a criminal and impotent delirium; all the Sovereigns of Europe animated by the same sentiments, and guided by the same principles, declare that if, contrary to all calculations, there should result from this event any real danger, they will be ready to give to the King of France, and to the French nation, or to any other Government that shall be attacked, as soon as they shall be called upon, all the assistance requisite to restore public tranquillity, and to make a common cause against all those who should undertake to compromise it. The present Declaration inserted in the Register of the Congress assembled at Vienna, on the 13th March, 1815, shall be made public. Done and attested by the Plenipotentiaries of the High Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris, Vienna, 13th March, 1815.

Austria.—Prince Metternich, Baron Wrisberg.

France.—Prince Talleyrand, the Duke of Dalberg, Latour du Pin, Count Alexis and Noailles.

Great Britain.—Wellington, Clancarty, Cathcart, Stewart.

Portugal.—Count Pamella Saldanha Lobos.

Prussia.—Prince Hardenberg, Baron Humboldt.

Russia.—Count Rasumowsky, Count Staeckelberg, Count Nesselrode.

Spain.—P. Gomez Labrador.

Sweden.—Lafmenhelm.





## ANSWER OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF PRESIDENTS OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE, APRIL 2.

In consequence of the remit which has been made to it, the Committee, composed of Presidents of Sections of the Council of State, has examined the Declaration of the 13th of March, the report of the Minister of General Police, and the documents thereto subjoined. The Declaration is in a form so unusual, conceived in terms so strange, expresses ideas so anti-social, that the Committee was ready to consider it as one of those forgeries by which despicable men seek to mislead the people, and produce a change in public opinion. But the verification of legal minutes drawn up at Metz and of the examinations of couriers, has left no ground for doubt that the transmission of this declaration was made by the Members of the French Legation at Vienna, and it must, therefore, be regarded as adopted and signed by them. It was in this first point of view that the Committee thought it their duty to examine, in the first instance, this production, which is without precedent in the annals of diplomacy, and in which Frenchmen, men invested with a public character the most respectable, begin by a sort of placing without the law, or, to speak more precisely, by an incitement to the assassination of the Emperor Napoleon. We say with the Minister of Police that this Declaration is the work of the French Plenipotentiaries; because those of Austria, Russia, Prussia, and England, could not have signed a deed which the Sovereigns and the nations to which they belong will hasten to disavow. For in the first place these Plenipotentiaries, most of whom co-operated in the treaty of Paris, know that Napoleon was there recognised as retaining the title of Emperor, and as Sovereign of the isle of Elba: they would have designated him by these titles, nor would have departed, either in substance or form, from the respectful notice which they impose. They would have felt that, according to the law of nations, the Prince least powerful from the extent or population of his states, enjoys, in regard to his political and civil character, the rights belonging to every Sovereign Prince equally with the most powerful Monarch; and Napoleon, recognized under the title of Emperor,

and as a Sovereign Prince by all the Powers, was no more than any one triable by the Congress of Vienna. An oblivion of those principles, which it is impossible to ascribe to Plenipotentiaries who weigh the rights of nations with deliberation and prudence, has in it nothing astonishing when it is displayed by some French ministers, whose consciences reproach them with more than one act of treason, in whom fear has produced rage, and whom remorse deprives of reason. Such persons might have risked the fabrication, the publication of a document like the pretended declaration of the 13th of March, in the hope of stopping the progress of Napoleon, and misleading the French people as to the true principles of foreign powers. But such men are not qualified, like the latter, to judge of the merit of a nation which they have misconceived, betrayed, delivered up to the arms of foreigners. That nation, brave and generous, revolts against every thing bearing the character of baseness and oppression; its affections become enthusiastic when their object is threatened or attacked by a great injustice; and the assassination to which the declaration of the 13th of March incites, will find an arm for its execution neither among the 25 millions of Frenchmen, the majority of whom followed, guarded, protected Napoleon from the Mediterranean to the capital, nor among the 18 millions of Italians, the 6 millions of Belgians and Rhenish, nor the numerous nations of Germany, who, at this solemn crisis, have not pronounced his name but with respectful recollections; nor amidst the indignant English nation, whose honourable sentiments disavow the language which has been audaciously put into the mouths of Sovereigns. The nations of Europe are enlightened; they judge the rights of the Allied Princes, and those of the Bourbons. They know that the convention of Fontainebleau was a treaty among Sovereigns; its violation, the entrance of Napoleon on the French territory, like every infraction of a diplomatic act, like every hostile invasion, could only lead to an ordinary war, the result of which can only be, in respect of persons, that of being conqueror or conquered, free, or a prisoner of war; in respect of possessions, that of being either preserved or lost, increased or diminished; and that every thought, every threat, every attempt against the life of a Prince at war with

another, is a thing unheard of in the history of nations and the cabinets of Europe. In the violence, the rage, the oblivion of principles which characterise the Declaration of the 13th of March, we recognise the envoys of the same Prince, the organs of the same Councils, which, by the Ordinance of the 9th of March, also placed Napoleon without the law, also invited against him the poniards of assassins, and promised a reward to the bringer of his head. What, however, did Napoleon do? He did honour by his confidence to the men of all nations, insulted by the infamous mission to which it was wished to invite them; he shewed himself moderate, generous, the protector even of those who had devoted him to death. When he spoke to General Excelmans, marching towards the column which closely followed Louis Stanislas Xavier; to Count D'Erlon, who had to receive him at Lille; to General Clausel, who went to Bordeaux, where was the Duchess D'Angouleme; to General Grouchy, dispatched to put a period to the civil dissensions excited by the Duke D'Angouleme—everywhere, in short, orders were given by the Emperor that persons should be protected and sheltered from every attack, every danger, every violence, while on the French territory, and when they quitted it. Nations and posterity will judge on which side, at this great conjuncture, has been respect for the rights of the people and of sovereigns, for the laws of war, the principles of civilization, the maxims of laws, civil and religious. They will decide between Napoleon and the House of Bourbon.

If, after having examined the pretended Declaration of the Congress under this first view, it is discussed in its relations to diplomatic conventions, and to the treaty of Fontainebleau of the 11th of April, 1814, ratified by the French government, it will be found that its violation is only imputable to the very persons who reproach Napoleon therewith. The treaty of Fontainebleau has been violated by the Allied Powers, and the House of Bourbon, in what regards the Emperor Napoleon and his family, in what regards the interests and the rights of the French nation.

*First*—The Empress Maria-Louisa and her son ought to have obtained passports, and an escort to repair to the Emperor; and far from executing this promise, they separated violently the

wife from the husband, the son from the father, and that during distressing circumstances, when the firmest soul has need of looking for consolation and support to the bosom of its family, and domestic affections.

*Secondly*—The safety of Napoleon, of his imperial family, and of their attendants, was guaranteed (14th article of treaty), by all the Powers; and bands of assassins have been organised in France under the eyes of the French Government, and even by its orders, as will soon be proved by the solemn process against the Sieur Demontbreuil, for the purpose of attacking the Emperor and his brothers and their wives: in default of the success which was expected from this first branch of the plot, a commotion had been planned at Orgon, on the Emperor's road, to attempt an attack on his life by the hands of some brigands: they sent a governor to Corsica an assassin of George's, the Sieur Brulart, raised purposely to the rank of Marshal-de-Camp, known in Britany, in Anjou, in Normandy, in La Vendee, in all England, by the blood which he had shed, that he might prepare and make sure the crime: and in fact several isolated assassins attempted, in the Isle of Elba, to gain by the murder of Napoleon the guilty and disgraceful salary which was promised to them.

*Thirdly*—The Duchies of Parma and Piacenza were given in full property to Maria Louisa for herself, her son, and her descendants; and after long refusals to put her in possession they gave the finish to their injustice by an absolute spoliation, under the delusive pretext of a change without valuation, without proportion, without sovereignty, without consent: and documents existing in the Foreign-office, which have been submitted to us, prove that it was on the solicitations, at the instance, and by the intrigues of the Prince of Benevent, that Maria Louisa and her son have been plundered.

*Fourthly*—There should have been given to the Prince Eugene, adopted son of the Emperor, who has done honour to France, which gave him birth, and who has conquered the affection of Italy, which adopted him, a suitable establishment out of France, and he has obtained nothing.

*Fifthly*—The Emperor had (art. 9, of the treaty) stipulated in favour of the heroes of the army, for the preservation of their endowments on the *Monte Napoleone*: he had reserved on the extraordinary domains, and on the funds of the civil list, means of recompensing his servants of paying the soldiers who attached themselves



to his destiny: all was carried away and kept back by the Ministers of the Bourbons. An agent for the French Military, M. Bresson, went in vain to Vienna, to claim for them the most sacred of properties—the price of their courage and blood.

*Sixthly*—The preservation of the goods, moveable and immovable, of the family of the Emperor, is stipulated by the same treaty (art. 6); and they have been plundered of one and of the other; that is to say, by main force in France, by commissioned brigands; in Italy, by the violence of the military chiefs; in the two countries, by sequestrations, and by seizures solemnly decreed.

*Seventhly*—The Emperor Napoleon was to have received 2,000,000, and his family 2,500,000 francs per annum, according to the arrangement established in the 6th article of the treaty: and the French Government has constantly refused to fulfil this engagement, and Napoleon would soon have been reduced to dismiss his faithful guard for want of means to secure their pay, if he had not found in the grateful recollections of the bankers, and merchants of Genoa and of Italy, the honourable resource of a loan of 12 millions which was offered to him.

*Eighthly*—In short, it was not without a reason that they wished by all means to separate from Napoleon those companions of his glory, models of devotedness and constancy, the unshaken guarantees of his safety and of his life. The island of Elba was secured to him in full property (art. 3, of the treaty) and the resolution to spoil him of it, which was desired by the Bourbons, and solicited by their agents, had been taken at the Congress.

And if Providence had not in its justice provided for him, Europe would have seen an attack made on the person on the liberty of Napoleon, banished for the future to the mercy of his enemies, far from his family, and separated from his servants, either to Saint Lucia, or St. Helena, which was intended for his prison. And when the Allied Powers, yielding to the imprudent wishes, to the cruel importunities of the house of Bourbon, had condescended to violate the solemn contract, on the faith of which Napoleon had released the French nation from its oaths: when himself and the members of his family saw themselves threatened, attacked in their persons, in their property, in their affections, in the rights stipulated in their favour, as Princes, even in those rights secured by the laws to simple citizens, what

could Napoleon do? Ought he, after having endured so many affronts, supported so many injuries, to have consented to the complete violation of the engagements made with him, and resigning himself personally to the lot which was prepared for him, abandon once more his wife, his son, his family, his faithful servants to their frightful destiny? Such a resolution appears above human strength; and yet Napoleon would have taken it, if peace and the happiness of France had been the price of this new sacrifice. He would have devoted himself again for the French people, of whom, as he wishes to declare to Europe, he makes it his glory to hold every thing, to whom he wishes to ascribe every thing, to whom alone he wishes to answer for all his actions, and to devote his life. It was for France alone, and to avert from it the misfortune of civil war, that he abdicated the crown in 1814. He restored to the French people the rights which he held of them: he left it free to choose for itself a new monarch, and to establish its liberty and its happiness on institutions which might protect both. He hoped for the nation the preservation of all which he had acquired by 25 years of combats and of glory, the exercise of its sovereignty in the choice of a dynasty, and in the stipulation of the conditions on which it would be called upon to reign. He expected from the new government respect for the glory of the armies, the rights of the brave, the guarantee of all the new interests, of those interests which had arisen and been maintained for a quarter of a century, resulting from all the laws political and civil, observed, revered during this period, because they were identified with the manners, the habits, the wants of the nation. Far from that, all idea of the sovereignty of the people was discarded. The principle on which all legislation, political and civil, since the Revolution, had rested, was equally discarded. France has been treated by the Bourbons like a revolted country, re-conquered by the arms of its ancient masters, and subjected anew to a feudal dominion. Louis Stanislas Xavier did not recognise the treaty, which alone made the Throne of France vacant, and the abdication which alone permitted him to ascend it. He pretended to have reigned 19 years, thus insulting both the governments which had been established in this period, and the

people who had consecrated them by its suffrages, and the army which had defended them, and even the Sovereigns who had recognized them in their numerous treaties. A charter digested by the Senate, all imperfect as it was, was thrown into oblivion. There was imposed on France a pretended constitutional law, as easy to elude as to revoke, and in the form of simple royal decrees, without consulting the nation, without hearing even those bodies, become illegal—phantoms of the national representation. And as the Bourbons passed ordinances without right, and promised without guarantee, they eluded without good faith, and executed without fidelity. The violation of the pretended Charter was restrained only by the timidity of their government; the extent of the abuses of power was only confined by its weakness. The dislocation of the army, the dispersion of its officers, the exile of many of them, the degradation of the soldiers, the suppression of their endowments, their deprivation of pay and half-pay, the reduction of the salaries of legionaries, their being stripped of their honours, the pre-eminence of the decorations of the feudal monarchy, the contempt of citizens, designated anew by the *Third Estate*, the prepared and already commenced spoliation of the purchasers of national property, the actual depreciation of that which they were obliged to sell, the return of feudality in its titles, its privileges, its lucrative rights, the re-establishment of ultramontane principles, the abolition of the liberties of the Gallican church, the annihilation of the Concordat, the restoration of tithes, the intolerance arising from an exclusive religion, the domination of a handful of nobles over a people accustomed to equality,—such was what the Bourbons either did or wished to do for France. It was under such circumstances that the Emperor Napoleon quitted the isle of Elba; such were the motives of the determination which he took, and not the consideration of his personal interests, so weak with him, compared with the interests of the nation to which he has consecrated his existence. He did not bring war into the bosom of France; on the contrary, he extinguished the war which the proprietors of national property, forming four-fifths of French landholders, would have been compelled to make on their spoilers; the war which

the citizens, oppressed, degraded, humiliated by nobles, would have been compelled to declare against their oppressors; the war which Protestants, Jews, men of various religions, would have been compelled to sustain against their persecutors. He came to deliver France, and was received as a deliverer. He arrived almost alone; he traversed 220 leagues without opposition, without combats, and resumed without resistance, amidst the capital and the acclamations of an immense majority of the citizens, the throne deserted by the Bourbons, who, in the army, in their household, among the national guards, were unable to arm an individual to attempt to maintain them there. And yet, replaced at the head of the nation, which had already chosen him thrice, which has just designated him a fourth time by the reception it gave him in his rapid and triumphant march and arrival,—of that nation by which and for the interest of which he means to reign, what is the wish of Napoleon? That which the French people wish—the independence of France, internal peace, peace with all nations, the execution of the treaty of Paris of the 30th of May, 1814. What is there then changed in the state of Europe and in the hope of repose it had promised itself? What voice is raised to demand that succour which, according to the declaration, should be only given when claimed? There has been nothing changed,—should the Allied Powers return, as we are bound to expect they will, to just and moderate sentiments, if they admit that the existence of France in a respectable and independent situation, as far removed from conquering as from being conquered, from dominating as from being enslaved, is necessary to the balance of great kingdoms, and to the security of small states. There has been nothing changed,—if respecting the rights of a great nation which wishes to respect the rights of all others, which, proud and generous, has been lowered, but never debased, it be left to resume a monarch, and to give itself a constitution and laws suited to its manners, its interests, its habits, and its new wants. There is nothing changed,—if not attempting to compel France to resume a dynasty which it no longer wishes, feudal chains which it has broken, and to submit to seigniorial and ecclesiastical claims from which it has been liberated, it is not wished to impose upon

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it laws, to intermeddle with its internal affairs, to assign it a form of government, to give it masters in conformity to the interests or the passions of its neighbours. There is nothing changed,—if while France is occupied in preparing the new social compact which shall guarantee the liberty of its citizens, the triumph of the liberal ideas which prevail in Europe, and can no longer be stifled, it be not forced to withdraw itself, in order to combat, from those pacific meditations and means of internal prosperity to which the people and their head wish to devote themselves in happy accordance. There has been nothing changed,—if, when the French nation asks only to remain at peace with all Europe, an unjust coalition do not compel it, as it did in 1792, to defend its will and its rights, its independence, and the sovereign of its choice.

(Signed) “The Minister of State, President of the Section of the Finances,

“The Count DEFERMON.

“The Minister of State, President of the Section of the Interior,

“The Count REGNAUD de ST. JEAN D'ANGELY.

“The President of the Section of Legislation,

“The Count BOULAY.

“The President of the Section of War,

“The Count ANDREOSSY.

(Certified conform.)

“The Minister Secretary of State,

“The Duke de BASSANO.”

#### REPORT TO THE EMPEROR.

Sire—If prudence makes it my duty not to present indiscreetly to your Majesty a phantom of chimerical dangers, it is for me an obligation not less sacred, not to suffer that vigilance to be lulled into a deceitful security which is prescribed to me by the care for the preservation of peace, that great interest of France, that primary object of the wishes of your Majesty. To see danger where none exists, is sometimes to provoke it, and to cause it to spring up from another side; to shut our eyes against the indications which may be the forerunners of it, would be an act of inexcusable insatiation. I ought not to dissemble, Sire, that though no positive information confirms, up to this day, on the part of foreign Powers, a resolution formally adopted, which should lead

us to presume upon a speedy war; yet appearances sufficiently authorise a just inquietude—alarming symptoms are manifested on all sides at once. In vain do you oppose the composure of reason to the tumult of the passions. The voice of your Majesty has not yet been able to make itself heard—an incomprehensible system threatens to prevail with the powers, that of preparing for combat without admitting any preliminary explanation with the nation which they seem determined to fight. By whatever pretext they pretend to justify so unheard of a proceeding, the conduct of your Majesty is its best refutation. The facts speak for themselves; they are simple, precise, incontestable; and from the mere statement which I am about to give of these facts, the Councils of all the Sovereigns of Europe, the governments and the nations, may alike pronounce judgment in this important cause.

Some days since, Sire, I found it necessary to call your attention to the preparations of the different foreign governments; but the germs of disturbance which for a moment sprang upon some points of our southern provinces, rendered our situation complicated. Perhaps that very natural feeling which causes us to wish above all things for the repression of every principle of internal dissension, would have prevented me, in spite of myself, from considering in so serious a light the menacing dispositions which are manifested abroad. The rapid dispersion of the enemies of our domestic tranquillity relieves me from all delicacy of that kind. The French nation has a right to hear the truth from its Government; and never could its Government have, as now, so strong a wish, or so powerful an interest, to tell it the whole truth. You resumed your crown, Sire, on the 1st of March. There are events so far beyond the calculations of human reason, that they escape the foresight of Kings and the sagacity of their Ministers. On the first report of your arrival on the shores of Provence, the Monarchs assembled at Vienna still considered your Majesty as no more than the sovereign of the Isle of Elba, when you already reigned again over the French empire. It was only in the palace of the Thuilleries that your Majesty learned the existence of their Declaration. The persons who signed that unaccountable document already understood of themselves

that your Majesty had no occasion to make any reply to it. Meanwhile all the proclamations, all the expressions of your Majesty, loudly attested the sincerity of your wishes for the maintenance of peace. It was my duty to inform the French political agents, employed abroad by the Royal Government, that their functions had expired, and to apprise them that your Majesty intended to accredit new Legations immediately. In your desire to leave no doubt respecting your real sentiments, your Majesty ordered me to enjoin those agents to be the interpreters of them to the different Cabinets. I obeyed that order by writing on the 30th of March to the Ambassadors, Ministers, and other agents, the subjoined letter. Not content with this first step, your Majesty determined, under these extraordinary circumstances to give to the manifestation of your pacific dispositions a character still more authentic and solemn: you thought that you could not stamp more éclat upon the expression of them, than by stating them yourself in a letter to the foreign Sovereigns. You directed me at the same time, to make a similar declaration to their Ministers. These two letters, copies of which I annex, dispatched on the 5th inst. are a monument which must for ever attest the honour and integrity of the intentions of your Imperial Majesty. While the moments of your Majesty were thus occupied, and as it were absorbed by one single thought, what was the conduct of the different Powers? In all ages nations have taken a pleasure in promoting the mutual communications between their governments; and cabinets themselves have made a point of facilitating these communications. In time of peace the object of these relations is to prolong its duration; in war they tend to the restoration of peace; in both circumstances they are a benefit to humanity. It was reserved for the present epoch to behold an association of Monarchs, forbidding simultaneously all connection with a great state, and closing the avenue to its amicable assurances. The couriers dispatched from Paris on the 30th of March, for the different courts, have not been able to reach the places of their destination. One could proceed no farther than Strasburg, and the Austrian General who commands at Kehl refused to allow him a passage even upon condition of his consenting to be ac-

companied by an escort. Another sent off for Italy was obliged to return from Turin without accomplishing the object of his mission. A third, destined for Berlin and the North, was apprehended at Mentz and ill-treated by the Prussian Commandant. His dispatches were seized by the Austrian General who commands in chief in that place. I have already learned, that among the couriers dispatched on the 5th instant, those destined for Germany and Italy were unable to pass the frontiers. I have no account of those who were sent off for the North and for England. When an almost impenetrable barrier is thus set up between the French Ministry and its agents abroad, between the Cabinet of your Majesty and those of other Sovereigns, your Minister, Sir, has no other means than the public acts of Foreign Governments of judging of their intentions.

ENGLAND.—The Constitution of England imposes on the Monarch fixed obligations towards the nation which he governs. As it is not in his power to act without its concurrence, he is obliged to communicate to it, if not his formal, at least his probable resolutions. The message transmitted to Parliament on the 5th inst. by the Prince Regent, is not calculated to excite any very extensive confidence in the friends of peace. I have the honour to submit this piece to your Majesty.—A first remark must painfully affect those who are acquainted with the rights of nations, and are anxious to see them respected by kings. The only motive alleged by the Prince Regent to justify the measures which he announces the intention of adopting is, that events have occurred in France contrary to the engagements contracted by the Allied Powers with one another; and this Sovereign of a free nation seems not even to pay the least attention to the wishes of the great nation among whom these events have taken place. It seems that in 1815, England and her Princes have no recollection of 1688! It seems that the Allied Powers, because they obtained a momentary advantage over the French people, have presumed, in regard to an internal act which most nearly concerns its whole existence, to stipulate for it, and without it, in contempt of the most sacred of its rights! The Prince Regent declares, that he is giving orders for the increase of the British forces both by



land and sea. Thus the French nation, of which he takes so little account, must be upon its guard on all sides: it has to fear a continental aggression, and at the same time must watch the whole extent of its coasts against the possibility of a descent. It is, says the Prince Regent, to render the security of Europe permanent, that he claims the support of the English nation. And how can he have occasion for this support when that security is not threatened? For the rest, the relations between the two countries have not suffered any alteration worthy of notice. On some points, particular facts prove that the English are solicitous to maintain the relations established by the peace. On others, different circumstances would lead to a contrary belief. Letters from Rochefort of the 7th inst mention some incidents which would be of an unfavourable omen if they were to be confirmed, and if not explained in a satisfactory manner: but our present accounts exhibit no character which would lead us to attach much importance to those incidents. In Austria, in Russia, in Prussia, in all parts of Germany, in Italy, in short every where, is to be seen a general arming.

AUSTRIA.—At Vienna, the recall of the Landwehr, lately disbanded, the opening of a new loan, the daily increasing progression of the discredit of the paper money, all announce the intention or the fear of war. Strong Austrian columns are on their march to reinforce the numerous corps already assembled in Italy. It may be doubted whether they are destined for aggressive operations, or are merely intended to keep in obedience Piedmont, Genoa, and the other parts of the Italian territory, where the clashing of interests may excite apprehensions of discontent.

NAPLES.—Amidst these preparations of Austria on the side of Italy, the King of Naples could not remain motionless. This Prince, whose assistance the Allies had, on a preceding occasion, invoked, whose legitimacy they had acknowledged, and whose existence they had guaranteed, could not be ignorant that their policy, since modified by different circumstances, would have endangered his throne, if, too intelligent to trust to their promises, he had not known how to strengthen himself on better foundations. Prudence has enjoined him to advance a few steps, to watch events more closely, and the neces-

sity of covering his kingdom has obliged him to take up military positions in the Roman States.

PRUSSIA.—The movements of Prussia are not less active. Every where the corps are completing. Officers on half-pay are ordered to join their corps: to accelerate their march, they grant them free posting; and this sacrifice, slight in appearance, but made by a calculating government, is not a small proof of the interest which it attaches to the rapidity of its preparations.

SARDINIA.—The first moment after your Majesty's return, a Commandant of the British troops, in concert with the Governor of the county of Nice, took possession of Monaco. By ancient treaties, renewed by the treaty of Paris, France alone has a right to place a garrison in that fortress. The time of this occupation by the Commandant of the English troops, sufficiently shows that he did this of himself, and without previous instructions from his Government. France must demand satisfaction for this affair from the Courts of London and Turin. She must require the evacuation of Monaco, and its being given up to a French garrison conformably to treaties; but your Majesty will, doubtless, be of opinion, that this affair can only become a subject of explanation, considering that the determination of the Sardinian Governor, and especially that of the English Commandant, have been accidental, and a sudden effect of the alarm occasioned by extraordinary movements.

SPAIN.—News from Spain, and an official letter from M. de Laval of the 28th March, state, that an army is to proceed to the line of the Pyrenees. The strength of that army will necessarily depend upon the internal situation of that monarch, and its ulterior movements upon the determination of the other States. France will remark that these orders were given upon the demand of the Duke and Duchess of Angouleme. Thus, in 1815, as in 1793, it is the French Princes that invite foreigners into our territories.

THE NETHERLANDS.—The assembling of troops of different nations in the new kingdom of the Netherlands, and the numerous debarcations of English troops, are known to your Majesty; a particular fact is added to the doubts which these assemblages may give rise to, relative to the dispositions of the Sovereign of that

country. I am informed that a convoy of 120 men and 12 officers, French prisoners from Russia, has been stopped on the side of Turlemont. In waiting to derive correct information on this point, and to demand, if necessary, redress for such a proceeding, I confine myself now to the statement of it to your Majesty, considering the importance which it receives from its connection with other circumstances which are developed around us.

Upon all parts of Europe at once, they are arming or marching, or ready to march. And against whom are these armaments directed? Sire, it is your Majesty they name, but it is France that is threatened. The least favourable peace that the Powers ever dared to offer you, is that with which your Majesty contents yourself. Why do they not now wish what they stipulated at Chaumont,—what they ratified at Paris? It is not then against the Monarch, it is against the French nation, against the independence of the people, against all that is dear to us, all that we have acquired after twenty-five years of suffering and of glory, against our liberties, our institutions, that hostile passions wish to make war: a part of the Bourbon family, and some men who have long ceased to be French, endeavour again to raise all the nations of Germany and the North, in the hope of returning a second time by force of arms on the soil which disclaims and wishes no longer to receive them. The same appeal has resounded for a moment in some countries of the South, and it is from Spanish troops that some people are redemanding the crown of France: it is a family again become private and solitary which thus implores the assistance of foreigners. Where are the public functionaries, the troops of the line, the national guards, the private inhabitants, who have accompanied it in its flight beyond our frontiers? To mean to re-establish the Bourbons once more, would be to declare war on the whole French population. When your Majesty entered Paris with an escort of a few men; when Bordeaux, Toulouse, Marseilles, and all the South are disentangling themselves in one day from the snares laid for them, it is a military movement that work these miracles; or rather, is it not a national movement, a movement common to all French hearts, which mixes in one feeling the love of country and the love of the Monarch who

will know how to defend it? It will then be to restore, to return upon us, a family which belongs neither to our age nor our manners; which know neither how to appreciate the elevation of our souls, nor to comprehend the extent of our rights; it will be to replace on our necks the triple yoke of absolute monarchy, fanaticism and feudality, that all Europe would appear to give itself up to an immense rising? One would say, that France, confined within its ancient limits, while the limits of other powers have been prodigiously extended,—that France, free, rich only in the great character which its revolutions have left, still holds too much space in the map of the world! Yes, if, contrary to the dearest wish of your Majesty, foreign Powers give the signal of a new war, it is France herself, it is the whole nation whom they mean to attack, though they pretend only to attack its Sovereign, though they affect to separate the nation from the Emperor. The contract of France with your Majesty is closer than any that ever united a nation to its Prince. The people and the monarch can only have the same friends and the same enemies. Is the question one of mere personal provocation between one Sovereign and another? That can be nothing else but an ordinary duel. What did Francis I. in his rage against Charles V.? He sent him a challenge. But to distinguish the chief of a nation from the nation itself, to protest that nothing is meant but against the person of the Prince, and to march against him alone a million of men, is playing too much with the cruelty of nations. The sole, the real object which the foreign powers can propose to themselves on the hypothesis of a new coalition, must be the exhaustion, the degradation of France; and to attain that object, the surest means in their view of it will be to impose upon it a government without force and without energy. This policy on their part, is not, besides, a new policy; the example has been given them by great masters. Thus the Romans proscribed such men as Mithridates and Nicomedes, while they covered with their haughty protection the Attaluses and the Prusiases, who priding themselves in the title of their freed-men, acknowledged that they only held from them their states and their crown. Thus the French nation would be assimilated to those Asiatic



nations, to whom the caprice of Rome gave for Kings, Princes whose submission and dependence were secure! In this view, the efforts which the Allied Powers may now attempt to make, would not have for their precise object to bring us back under a dynasty rejected by public opinion. It would not be the Bourbons in particular whom they would wish to protect; for a long time past, their cause, abandoned by themselves, has been so by all Europe; and that unfortunate family has every where been subjected to a disdain but too cruel. The choice of the monarch whom they should place on the throne of France would be of little importance to the Allies, provided they saw there seated with him weakness and pusillanimity: this would be the most sensible outrage that could be done to the honour of a magnanimous and generous nation. It is that which has already most deeply wounded French hearts, and of which the renewal would be the most insupportable. Although in the latter months of 1813, that famous Declaration was published at Frankfort, by which it was solemnly announced that they wished France to be *great, happy, and free*, what was the result of those pompous assurances? At the same moment they violated the Swiss neutrality. When, in short, on the French soil, in order to cool patriotism and to disorganise the interior, they continued to promise to France an existence and liberal laws, the events soon shewed what confidence was due to such engagements. Enlightened by experience, France has its eyes opened; there is not one of its citizens who does not observe and judge what passes around it: inclosed within its ancient frontier, when it cannot give offence to other governments, every attack against its own sovereign is a tendency to interfere in its internal affairs, and will appear only an attempt to divide its strength by civil war, and to complete its ruin and dismemberment. However, Sire, even to this day, all is menace, and as yet there is no hostility. Your Majesty will not wish that incidents proceeding from the individual dispositions of particular commanders, either little scrupulous observers of the orders of their court, or too ready to anticipate their supposed intentions, should be considered as acts springing from the will of those powers, and as having broke the state of peace. No offi-

cial act has proved the determination of a rupture. We are reduced to vague conjectures, to reports perhaps false. It appears certain that on the 26th of March a new agreement was signed, in which the powers consecrated the former alliance of Chaumont. If the object of it is defensive, it enters into the views of your Majesty yourself, and France has no cause to complain; if it were otherwise, it is the independence of the French nation which would be attacked, and France would know how to repel an aggression so odious. The Prince Regent of England declares that he wishes, before he acts, to come to an understanding with the other powers. All those powers are armed, and they deliberate. France, excluded from these deliberations of which it is the principal object; France alone deliberates, and is not yet armed. In circumstances so important, in the midst of those uncertainties as to the real dispositions of foreign powers, dispositions whose exterior acts are of a nature to authorise just alarms, the sentiments and wishes of your Majesty for the maintenance of peace, and of the treaty of Paris, ought not to prevent legitimate precautions. I therefore think it my duty to call the attention of your Majesty, and the reflections of your Council, to the measures which the preservation of her rights, the safety of her territory, and the defence of the national honour, ought to dictate to France.

(Signed)

CAULINCOURT, Duke of Vicenza.

CIRCULAR ADDRESSED TO AMBASSADORS,  
MINISTERS, AND OTHER AGENTS OF  
FRANCE ABROAD.

Paris, March 30, 1815.

SIR.—The wishes of the French nation never ceased to recall the Sovereign of its choice, the only Prince who can guarantee to it the conservation of its liberty and independence. The Emperor appeared, and the royal government no longer exists. At the sight of the universal movement which carried both the people and the army towards their legitimate Monarch, the family of the Bourbons perceived that there remained no other course for them but to take refuge in a foreign country. They have quitted the French soil, without a single musket having been fired, or a drop of blood shed in their defence. The military household which accompanied them has collected at Bethune, where it declared its submission to the orders of the Emperor. It has given up its horses and arms: more than half of it has entered our ranks; the rest, few in number, are retiring to their homes, happy to find an asylum in the generosity of

his Imperial Majesty. The most profound tranquillity reigns throughout the whole extent of the empire. Every where the same cry is heard; never did a nation present the spectacle of more complete unanimity in the expression of its happiness and joy. This great change has been only the work of a few days. It is the finest triumph of the confidence of a monarch in the love of his people; it is at the same time the most extraordinary act of the will of a nation which knows its rights and its true duties. The functions entrusted to you by the royal government have terminated; and I am about to take, without delay, the orders of his Majesty the Emperor, in order to accredit a new legation. You must immediately, Sir, assume the tri-coloured cockade and cause it to be taken by the Frenchmen who are about you. If, at the moment of quitting the Court where you reside, you have occasion to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs, you will inform him that the Emperor has nothing more at heart than the maintenance of peace: that his Majesty has renounced the plans of greatness which he might have anteriorly formed; and that the system of his Cabinet, as well as the whole of the direction of affairs in France, is upon a totally different principle. I cannot doubt, Sir, that you will consider it as a duty to make known to the Frenchmen about you, the new situation of France, and that in which, according to our laws they find themselves placed.

(Signed) CAULAINCOURT, Duke of  
Vicenza.

LETTER, (THE ORIGINAL IN THE HAND-  
WRITING OF NAPOLEON), ADDRESSED TO  
ALL THE SOVEREIGNS OF EUROPE.

Sir, my Brother! You will have learned in the course of the last month my return on the shores of France, my entrance into Paris, and the departure of the family of the Bourbons. The true nature of these events must now be known to your Majesty. They are the work of an irresistible power, the work of the unanimous will of a great nation, which knows its duties and its rights. The dynasty, which force had imposed on the French people, was no longer made for it: the Bourbons would not accord with its sentiments or its manners: France has separated itself from them. Its voice called for a deliverer. The expectation which decided me to make the greatest of sacrifices was disappointed. I came, and from the point where I touched the shore the love of my people carried me even to the bosom of my capital. The first duty of my heart is to repay so much affection by the maintenance of an honourable tranquillity. The re-establishment of the Imperial Throne was necessary for the happiness of Frenchmen. My dearest thought, is, at the same time, to make it useful to the securing of the repose of Europe. Sufficient glory has adorned by turns the flags of different nations. The vicissitudes of fortune have caused sufficient great reverses to succeed to great successes. A finer field is now open for sovereigns, and I am the first to enter it. After having presented to the world the spectacle of great combats, it will be more delightful in future, to know no other rivalry except that of the advantages of peace, no other struggle except the

sacred struggle for the happiness of our people. France is glad to proclaim with frankness this noble end of all its wishes. Jealous of its independence, the invariable principle of its policy will be the most absolute respect for the independence of other nations: of such, as I have a happy confidence, shall be the personal sentiments of your Majesty, the general tranquillity is secured for a long time; and justice, seated on the confines of different states, will alone suffice to guard their frontiers. I seize with eagerness, &c. &c."

"Paris, April 4." (Signed) "NAPOLEON."

#### THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON.

No event, in the history of the world, ever gave rise to so much speculation, or so great a diversity of opinion as the event of Napoleon's abdication of the thrones of France and Italy. Those who had all along been hostile towards him; those who abused him when he was fighting under the banners of republicanism; those who called him all sorts of names when, as First Consul, he led the French armies to victory; those who calumniated him because he defeated the enemies of France even after he assumed the title and dignity of an Emperor; those, in short, who, from first to last, have hated and detested this extraordinary man, and who took every opportunity to shew their rancour and malice against him. All this tribe of vipers, who have always been, and still are, very numerous, were forward in maintaining that Napoleon resigned his crown and consented to retire to Elba, because he had been defeated by the Allies; because his marshals and his army had deserted him; and because he had for ever lost the affections of the people of France, in consequence of his alledged tyranny and oppression.—Nothing appeared so clear to these sagacious politicians, nothing so certain, at the time, as that Napoleon owed his misfortunes to these causes, and that it was impossible he could ever recover his fallen fortunes. Had the statements which these men set forth been true, it is unquestionable that their conclusions would have been just; but as these statements were altogether the result of malice, as they were from the beginning, and all through, dictated by a hatred of liberty, and of every man who gave it support, their conclusions have proved as fallacious as the premises upon which they were founded.—It was with a *partial and prejudiced* eye they viewed the conduct of Napoleon, in whatever situation he was,



placed.—It was impossible, therefore, they could be correct either as to his motives of action or the consequences likely to result from the step which he took. It is pretty certain also that the abdication of Napoleon was an event which his enemies little expected. They could not conceive how a man that had been so long accustomed to dispose of crowns at pleasure, could so far become the master of himself; could so readily subdue, what they called, his inordinate ambition, could bring his mind so easily to abandon the splendour, the dignity, the glory that is supposed, by its votaries, to accompany royalty. They had no conception, no idea that Napoleon, the haughty, the despotic Napoleon, the slave of every vile and despicable passion, was capable of conquering himself, and of voluntarily relinquishing empire over a nation so powerful and so celebrated as that of France. Therefore these vile detractors of his fame, confounded at the unexpected event, had determined never to give him credit for any one act of his life; those hired calumniators resolved, the moment they had in some measure recovered from their stupor, to give Napoleon no quarter. He was a coward, a paltrion, a contemptible fellow.—A thousand anecdotes were invented, to shew that he had resigned his crown merely to insure his personal safety; that he had preferred a secure retreat to the welfare of his old and faithful adherents; and that, when the means of wiping off the disgrace, which this shameful conduct entailed upon him; when he was urged by his nearest and dearest friends to imitate the example of the ancient Roman heroes, and to close his career by what they ironically denominated, a deed worthy of his great name, he cowardly rejected the proposal, shrunk from the appearance of death, which he had so often braved in a thousand forms, and sought a hiding place, from the scrutiny and contempt of honourable minds, on a barren and inaccessible rock in the Ocean.—Thus it was that the haters of Napoleon explained his motives of action; thus it was that they scrutinized his conduct.—The reader who was accustomed at that period to attend to the remarks which I offered on this subject, will not fail to recollect that I ventured, notwithstanding the almost universally prevailing clamour against Napoleon, to oppose this over-

whelming torrent of malignity, of prejudice, of malice, and of misrepresentation. I denied that Napoleon had ever been defeated in the field. He, no doubt, found it necessary to retreat after the battle of Leipsic. But this, confessedly, was occasioned by the defection of his Allies, who went over to the Confederates in the heat of the engagement. Even the treason which led to this disaster did not prevent Napoleon carrying off the greater part of his faithful troops, a circumstance which could not have happened had he suffered a defeat. During the six weeks he resisted, with a handful of men, the whole combined forces of Europe, in their attempts to reach Paris, he was on all occasions successful when he could bring his opponents to face him in battle. The astonishing skill, and undaunted bravery which he displayed in that campaign, with so fearful an odds against him, would have been sufficient to immortalize his name as a warrior, had he done nothing else to insure the suffrages of posterity. It was in this light I viewed him at the time. It was in language similar to this that I conveyed my ideas of his astonishing exploits; and when at last he was forced to give up the contest, I hesitated not to attribute this to treason, to foul and premeditated treason, on the part of those in whom he had placed implicit confidence. Still it was in his power, I remarked, to prolong hostilities, even after the Allies got possession of the capital. He had, I stated, a considerable force under his immediate command, which, with the troops occupying the garrisons, and acting in other parts of France, would have formed an army, wholly attached to his person, sufficiently formidable to make head against the invaders. With this force, I observed, it was in his power to render a contest for the government of the country a matter at least of considerable doubt, had he not preferred the tranquillity and the prosperity of France to his own individual rights. The Allied Powers had declared that they would not enter upon terms with Napoleon, or any of his family. This was making it a personal quarrel, which would have led immediately to a civil war in France. To avoid this, I said, Napoleon readily abandoned all his pretensions to the crown, agreed to accept a pension for himself and house, and to become an exile, in order to give the nation an oppor-

tunity of choosing another ruler. I also remarked, that the conditions of the treaty of Fontainebleau was such, as clearly shewed that the Allies still considered him a formidable personage, whom it was desirable to get rid of almost upon any terms; that, instead of having been dictated to, Napoleon had proposed the articles of the treaty, which the Allies considered it prudent to accept, rather than risk a renewal of the contest with a man who had so often made them feel the fatal effects of opposing his measures. In fact, had not Napoleon obtained a victory over himself; had he not preferred the happiness of France to his own immediate interest, a struggle for authority might have commenced, more fatal to the country than all she had endured in the course of the revolution. With these views it might have been easy for me to have predicted the return of Napoleon, had it been safe in the then state of Europe to hint at such an event. But whatever danger there might have been in avowing this opinion, I knew that there was none in being persuaded in my own mind that he would be recalled by the people of France. I never once doubted this, though, I confess, it happened at a period when I least looked for it, and has been attended with consequences more favorable to liberty than my most sanguine expectations had led me to expect. But while the fact of Napoleon's restoration, proves the correctness of my former views as to that particular, it has also brought to light a mass of evidence as to the real causes of his abdication, and the highly favorable terms he obtained from the Allies, which completely lays open the falsehoods of his traducers, and gives to my original speculations on these topics an importance which I scarcely calculated they ever would receive. I had no means of discovering the motives which influenced the Allies, or any part of their deliberations; but, from what has been repeatedly stated by Ministers, in both houses of Parliament,—from official papers laid on the table of the House of Commons—and from the important French documents inserted above, it is perfectly obvious that my remarks at the time of Napoleon's abdication, were as correct as if I had been fully acquainted with the discussions which led to the treaty of Fontainebleau. In fact, it now appears that the Allied Sovereigns neither considered

Napoleon in the light of a defeated or a degraded Monarch, with whom no chances of recovery remained. On the contrary, it is plainly admitted, that the advantageous terms which he obtained, were the consequence of his being then too formidable to temporize with, and too much the idol of the army to think of prescribing any other conditions to him than what, in the circumstances, were honourable and just. The particular acts of treason, which paralyzed the efforts of Napoleon, have also been distinctly admitted by those who formerly denied them. All this, I am aware, has not resulted from a desire to do justice to that great character. He never would, I am satisfied, have been able to draw from his enemies an acknowledgment of the truth, had they not found this acknowledgment necessary to their own justification. But in whatever way the truth has come out, it is now before the public, and ought to have the effect, at least, of undeceiving them, of opening their eyes to the villainous efforts which are every day making, by a base and corrupted press, to involve us in a new war with France. All that these hirelings said as to the causes of Napoleon's abdication; all the lies they invented to make it be believed, that he was deserted by his army, and hated by the people; all and every one of these falsehoods and calumnies have now been exposed and refuted, and that by the publication of documents which cannot be controverted, and which always command the highest assent. But sincerely as I wish these facts to produce a corresponding effect, I am much afraid that the attempts again making to mislead the public mind, will counteract every endeavour of mine to dispose them to peaceable pursuits. How, indeed, can it be otherwise, when the mass of the people are so fickle and inconsistent. They cry for war; nothing will satisfy them but interminable war; yet, with the same breath, they grumble and fret against the taxes, without which it is impossible for any set of men to carry on war. They would have Napoleon destroyed; they would have France degraded and partitioned; but although they know that these things cannot even be attempted without money, that new and large loans must be resorted to, that the assessed taxes must be greatly increased to pay the interest of these, and that the *Income Tax*, that tax which



has already been denominated a "highwayman's tax" by the supporters of the "Social System," is to be renewed with all its terrors. Although they have already felt, and must again feel the pernicious effects of these measures, even should the country continue in a state of peace, they still bawl out for war, for the punishment of the "rebels" in France, for the overthrow of those institutions which have exalted France to so lofty a pinnacle, and for the destruction of that man who has endeared himself to the whole nation, by uniformly protecting these institutions. All this the enemies of France, and of liberty, demand at the hands of ministers, and yet they are so unreasonable as to complain because they are called upon to contribute the means by which alone their wishes are to be accomplished. If we are to have war with France, I am satisfied that neither ten nor fifteen per cent. on income will be sufficient to support it for any length of time. According to present appearances, France will not be very speedily reduced. It will take *twenty* per cent. at least to accomplish this, if ever it is accomplished. Let those then, who cry for war, who cant incessantly about the establishment of the "Social System," and the preservation of our "holy religion," look to this.—They are, at this moment, more likely than ever to see the flames of war rekindled in Europe; but while they feel so much gratification in this, let them at least be thankful to those who have been the cause of it. Let those who are active in endeavouring to bring on a war, have all the money they desire. It is by money only that the means of prosecuting the war can be procured. How senseless, how stupid, how inconsistent it is in us to expect war, and not expect that we will be called on to pay for it.

#### PEACE OR WAR.

Mr. COBBETT,—If ever there was a time when the interests of mankind imperiously called on the advocates of peace to exert their influence, the present is that time. You, Sir, have raised your powerful voice in her defence, in a manner truly honourable to your character, and worthy the approbation of every friend to humanity. Be not weary in well doing.

While hope remains, put forth your manly strength; unite firmness with moderation; convincing argument with eloquence; and continue to demonstrate to the divided world, that Peace is better than War.—No period, in the annals of history, affords to the contemplative mind a collection of events so great in magnitude, so extensive in their interests, or so awful in their consequences, as those which at this moment agitate Europe. It is not the concern of a single nation, or the interest of this generation only, but the prosperity and happiness of nations unborn, of ages yet to come, that are involved in the doubtful determination of a few individuals.—What heart, possessed of a single spark of humanity, does not sicken when he views the sanguinary *Proclamation* issued at *Vien-na*? Are our principles and dispositions to be guided by the hostile spirit it breathes?—Are we to draw our rules of morality and justice from thence?—Does the happiness of society and the world depend on doing evil that good may come?—If ever a public declaration merited universal censure, surely this of all others demands it. Are these the specimens of moderation proceeding from the "*Deliverers of Europe*?"—What awful consequences may we not expect, if the same spirit is to pervade our councils, and govern our national divisions?—It appears to me, Sir, that this is the momentous period, when the inhabitants of the country should step forward to implore and petition Parliament, to avert the melancholy calamities a new war would inevitably produce.—I admit that recent circumstances do not give us much encouragement to believe the voice of the people would be effectually regarded; yet the late unsuccessful attempt is not without important advantages, in as much as it has, in my opinion, done more to convince the bulk of mankind of the absolute necessity of Parliamentary Reform than any single event during a long period of time.—A few more such refusals against the public will, might excite a spirit and an energy in the nation which would command attention.—If the public feeling is not moved, on the present occasion, to express its disapprobation at threatened hostilities, the administration of the country will be more excusable by resolving on prosecuting a war. Of what real advantage will it be to this nation that the Bourbon family should again re-



ascend the throne of France? Has the former sway of that House proved so *beneficial* to England? Are we compensated for the immense expenditure of treasure, and the waste of lives it has cost Great Britain, in fruitless attempts to re-establish the Bourbons? Is the interest of a single foreign family to rise paramount to the interest of a whole Empire? What can so far infatuate the minds of the enemies of peace? Is it the genuine love they bear to Louis, or the real hatred they feel to Napoleon? Are these causes sufficient why the blood of England should again flow in torrents? Is the war faction so sure of success as to leave no fearful doubts of accomplishing their wishes? Is Bonaparte a novice in the art of war, or so feeble a politician as to be unable to guide the immense power which 25 millions of people have placed in his hands? Because of his former momentary humiliation, a humiliation ascribed to *one* rash enterprise, are we to calculate on a repetition of such fortuitous events? Experience, the best instructor, will correct his impetuous judgment, and influence him to more caution. His situation at this moment, is far different to that in which he stood after his return from Russia. Not less than 200,000 soldiers, prisoners from various nations, have returned to France. Nearly the whole, it may fairly be presumed, will gladly rejoin their old idolized Captain. He has also possession of all the well fortified places throughout the Empire. The wonderful enterprize, from Elba to Paris, without the slightest opposition, must inspire a military ardour through every rank in the army, and diffuse a martial glory over the whole nation.—If any act can give a just title to a crown, it must be the voice of the people. This voice has been plainly manifested throughout all France.—Never was there a more unequivocal proof exhibited to the world. The unanimity of the French people, is the best pledge of Buonaparte's strength, and ultimate success. The same principle that gave to the House of Brunswick the throne of England, justifies Napoleon's claim to the throne of France. The Sovereign will of the people is the only fountain of legitimate authority. If this right

is disputed, or an opposite principle recognised, the nation admit it is already enslaved, and has nothing to expect but oppression, taxation, and cruelty. Let the question be dispassionately asked:—Shall we gain by recommencing hostilities against France? Shall we look back to the last twenty-five years, and, by this retrospect, fortify our minds and stimulate our desires to a fresh combat? Will the millions of money expended, the incalculable number of lives lost, the increased paupers throughout every city, town, village, or hamlet; will these excite with ardour the mind to renewed acts of desolating slaughter? Will the moral sense be improved, and the best feelings of humanity advanced? Will our character as a nation professing christianity exemplify the charities of that religion we boast? Judging from past conduct, we seem to imagine war a *necessary good*, rather than the greatest evil that can afflict a nation. Are we desirous for the revisitation of the Income Tax, the loss of commerce, and the depression of public spirit? Such consequences are inseparable with a state of warfare.—If the contest *once begins*, who can say where it will end? We may flatter ourselves it will be of short duration.—This delusive hope existed in the commencement of the former war; yet it continued for a quarter of a century. Is England now in equal condition to supply the Allies with money. The wealth of England must flow, otherwise the combat will be of short continuance. But *why* should England provide for the expences of other nations? Has she a deeper interest at stake than they have? Or does she entertain a greater hate to the power of France? Is not our former useless prodigality, by which our national debt is so enormously increased, sufficient to check further subsidies? Are our public expences *never* to be economized? Or must we run the desperate hazard of universal ruin, which, in my humble opinion, may be awfully demonstrated in the prosecution of another war with France?

I am, &c.

MERCATOR.

Birmingham, 12th April.